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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JOHN FRANCIS MCKENNA,
Petitioner-Appellant.

Case No. 870534-CA

vs.
GERALD L. COOK, Warden;
DAVID L. WILKINSON, Utah State
Attorney General,

Category 3

Respondent-Appellee.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a dismissal of a Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus in the Third Judicial District Court.

This

Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(g) (Supp. 1988).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether petitioner could raise issues in a post-

conviction relief action which were not raised on direct appeal?
2.

Whether petitioner could have raised his claim of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner was convicted of two counts of Aggravated
Assault, third degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
S76-5-103 (1978, as amended), in a jury trial held October 21-22,
1985, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Dean E. Conder, Judge,
presiding.

Judge Conder sentenced petitioner on March 31, 1986,

to two concurrent terms of zero to five years in the Utah State
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to two concurrent terms of zero to five years in the Utah State
Prison.

The Utah Supreme Court affirmed petitioner's conviction

in State v. McKenna, 728 P.2d 984 (Utah 1986).

(See Addendum

"A")
Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge,
presiding. (R. 2). Upon the State's motion, Judge Sawaya
dismissed the petition because petitioner could and should have
raised

all issues concerning his conviction on direct appeal.
(See Addendum MB")

(R. 44-6).

Petitioner now appeals that

dismissal.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Petitioner visited his estranged wife early in the
morning of August 21, 1985 (R. 22). Upon learning she had spent
the night with another man, petitioner became enraged (R. 22).
Petitioner left, obtained a gun, and returned to his wife's
apartment (R. 22). Petitioner beat, kicked, and threatened the
other man until petitioner successfully chased him from the
apartment (R. 22).
Angered, petitioner's wife ordered petitioner out of
her apartment (R. 22). Petitioner administered a severe and
vicious beating upon his wife (R. 22, 23). In the course of the
beating, petitioner shot his wife in the shoulder (R. 22).
Petitioner was convicted by a jury of two counts of
aggravated assault (R. 22). Petitioner's conviction was affirmed
by the Utah Supreme Court on appeal (R. 21-23) (See Addendum
"A") .
-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Petitioner filed a Writ of Habeas Corpus attacking his
conviction (R. 2). On October 8, 1987, Judge Sawaya signed a
minute entry dismissing the Writ and sent copies of the minute
entry to the parties (R. 41, 44-46).

Petitioner filed a notice

of appeal on November 16, 1987, more than 30 days after the
signed dismissal (R. 42). Judge Sawaya later entered Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an Order on January 5, 1988 (R. 4446).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Petitioner's alleged errors could and should have been
raised on direct appeal and therefore cannot be raised for the
first time in a post-conviction relief action.
Petitioner had adequate opportunity to raise the issue
of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal and
therefore cannot use his ineffectiveness claim to raise new
issues in a post-conviction relief action.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT
PETITIONER COULD AND SHOULD HAVE RAISED ALL
ISSUES CONCERNING HIS CONVICTION ON DIRECT
APPEAL.
Petitioner first asserts that his petition for a Writ
of Habeas Corpus is not an attempt to circumvent proper appellate
procedure.

Defendant's assertion is meritless.

As noted above, a minute entry was signed on October 8, 1987,
dismissing petitioner's writ (T. 41). Copies were sent to the
parties (T. 41). In Dove v. Cude, 710 P.2d 170 (Utah 1985) the
Utah Supreme Court said that "[a] signed minute entry may be a
final order for purposes of appeal." Ld. at 171 n.l. Because
petitioner filed his notice of appeal on November 16, 1987,

-3-
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It is well settled law in Utah that if alleged errors
could have been raised on direct appeal, this court is "precluded
under basic principles of appellate review from addressing them
now."

Bundy v. Deland, 94 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 9 (Sup. Ct. October

26, 1988)

In stating a post-conviction claim, a petitioner must

allege an "obvious injustice or a substantial and prejudicial
denial of a constitutional right in the trial of a matter; . . ."
Id.
The Utah Supreme Court in Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d
1101 (Utah 1983) clearly emphasized the standards for Habeas
Corpus review:
It is therefore well settled in this state
that allegations of error that could have
been but were not raised on appeal from a
criminal conviction cannot be raised by
habeas corpus or postconviction review,
except in unusual circumstances.
A much-quoted statement of the type of
errors that are and are not cognizable by
habeas corpus is the following from this
Court's unanimous opinion in Brown v. Turner,
21 Utah 2d 96, 98-99, 440 P.2d 968, 969
(1968) (Crockett, C.J.):
[Habeas corpus] is an extraordinary remedy which is properly
invocable only when the court
had no jurisdiction over the
Cont. petitioner exceeded the time limit for filing a notice
of appeal as required by Rule 4(a), Rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals. This Court would therefore lack jurisdiction.
However, the State recognizes that the Rules of the Utah Court
of Appeals, Rule 4(c), states that a notice of appeal "filed
after the announcement of . . . an order but before the entry of
the . . . order of the district court . . . shall be treated as
filed after such entry and on the day thereof." !Id. Because the
trial court entered Findings, Conclusions and an Order on January
5, 1988, petitioner's notice of appeal could arguably be
considered filed on the same date.
-4-
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person or the offense, or where
the requirements of law have
been so disregarded that the
party is substantially and
effectively denied due process
of law, or where some such fact
is shown that it would be
unconscionable not to re-examine
the conviction. If the
contention of error is something
which is known or should be
known to the party at the time
the judgement was entered, it
must be reviewed in the manner
and within the time permitted by
regular prescribed procedure, or
the judgment becomes final and
is not subject to further
attack, except in some such
unusual circumstance as we have
mentioned above. Were it
otherwise, the regular rules of
procedure governing appeals and
the limitations of time
specified therein would be
rendered impotent.
Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d at 1104-05 (bracketed material and
emphasis in original).

See also Bundy v. Deland, 94 Utah Adv.

Rep. at 9-10.
The court in Codianna rejected the argument that
ineffective assistance of counsel necessarily constitutes the
"unusual circumstances" that would allow petitioner to bypass the
regular appellate process in favor of Habeas Corpus.

The court

stated:
To permit the inevitable instances of
attorney oversight or ignorance to qualify
for the "unusual circumstances" exception
would allow that exception to swallow up the
rule, thereby transforming habeas corpus from
an extraordinary remedy into an alternative
appeal mechanism in contravention of the
finality of criminal judgments that is the
settled policy of this state.
Id. at 1105.
-5-
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The following must be considered in determining whether
a conviction should be set aside on the basis of ineffective
assistance of counsel:
(1)
The burden of establishing inadequate
representation is on the defendantf "and
proof of such must be a demonstrable reality
and not a speculative matter." State v.
McNicol, 554 P.2d at 204. (2) A lawyer's
"legitimate exercise of judgment" in the
choice of trial strategy or tactics that did
not produce the anticipated result does not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d at 205. (3) It
must appear that any deficiency in the
performance of counsel was prejudicial.
State v. Forsyth, Utah, 560 P.2d 337, 339
(1977); Jaramillo v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 19,
22, 465 P.2d 343, 345 (1970). In this
context, prejudice means that without
counsel's error there was a "reasonable
likelihood that there would have been a
different result. . ." State v. Gray, 601
P.2d at 920. Similarly, as we noted in State
v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d at 58, "the failure of
counsel to make motions or objections which
would be futile if raised does not constitute
ineffective assistance."
Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d at 1109.

"If counsel's deficiencies

were sufficiently grievous [to meet these requirements], they
constituted a violation of due process that is clearly
reviewable" in this action. Id. at 1105.
In the present case, petitioner claims his attorney was
ineffective because she did not press for admission of
corroborating and mitigating evidence.

However, petitioner fails

to demonstrate how the result of his conviction would have been
different had his attorney pressed for admission of such

-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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corroborating and mitigating evidence.

Petitioner has done

nothing more than speculate that the result might have been
3
different.
Thus, the trial court did not err in ruling that
petitioner failed to plead inadequate representation amounting to
a denial of due process justifying collateral review.
Furthermore, petitioner knew or should have known,
prior to appeal, that his attorney did not press to admit the
above evidence.

Therefore, petitioner knew or should have known

prior to appeal whether or not his counsel was ineffective at
trial.

Consequently, petitioner is foreclosed from raising this

issue in a post-conviction relief action.

See Codianna v.

Morris, 660 P.2d at 1105.
POINT II
PETITIONER HAD ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE
THE ISSUE OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL ON DIRECT APPEAL.
Petitioner asserts that he could not have known about
his counsel's ineffectiveness concerning his appeal until after
the appeal was already filed.

He then concludes that he could

Petitioner asserts a conference occurred in chambers wherein
the court decided to exclude the possible mitigating testimony.
Petitioner further claims that he was not included in the
conference. Petitioner cites to a trial transcript which is not
a part of the record on appeal. Accordingly, this court should
limit its review to the facts supported by the appellate record.
State v. Wulfenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 292-93 (Utah 1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1044 (1983).
3
Petitioner apparently takes the position that because he
alleges that mitigating evidence exists, he has established a
"demonstrable reality." Petitioner fails to explain how the
content of the evidence would change the result of his trial.
Merely alleging the existence of evidence without demonstrating
the content of the evidence is insufficient to establish a
"demonstrative reality."
-7-
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not have raised ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal.
Petitioner's assertion is errornous.
In Hafen v. Morris, 632 P.2d 875 (Utah 1981), the Utah
Supreme Court encountered the same claim.
was convicted and sentenced to prison.

In Hafen, defendant

Jto., at 876.

appealed and his conviction was affirmed. Id.

Hafen

Hafen then sought

Habeas Review and claimed that his trial attorney "failed to
honor his request to challenge a juror who appellant knew.
Appellant also claimed that his trial attorney failed to raise
that issue on appeal although appellant had so requested."
at 876.

Id.,

Naturally, petitioner Hafen in his post-conviction

action claimed "he was denied effective assistance of counsel. .
. " ^d.

The lower court:
dismissed his petition on the ground that he
had waived any right to raise the issue of
the failure of his attorney to challenge the
juror. The court determined that it would
not grant an evidentiary hearing on that
issue since it could have been raised at
appellant's trial or on appeal. . . .

Id.

The Supreme Court upheld the lower court and stated:
We explained further, in Brown v. Turner, 21
Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968 (1968), that "If the
contention of error is something which is
known or should be known to the party at the
time the judgment was entered, it must be
reviewed in the manner and within the time
permitted by regular prescribed procedure, or
the judgment becomes final and is not subject
to further attack, except in some such
unusual circumstances as we have mentioned
above. Were it otherwise, the regular rules
of procedure governing appeals and the
limitations of time specified therein would
be rendered impotent."
Waiver was found in Schad v. Turner,
supra, where the petitioner in a petition for
habeas corpus attempted to raise as an issue
-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that the District Attorney had exceeded the
bounds of propriety in his cross-examination
of the petitioner at the trial. We there
observed that since that was an issue which
could have been raised on the petitioner's
former appeal of his case to this Court, we
would not take cognizance of it on a later
petition for habeas corpus.
If the appellant's counsel did in fact fail
to honor his request to challenge the juror,
the appellant had the adequate opportunity at
the trial to have made complaint to the
court. Furthermore, following his conviction
that issue could have been raised by him in
this Court in his appeal which pended in tihis
Court for many months, l.i 1 view of his
silence, the trial judge correctly ruled that
he had waived any claim of error in this
regard. There are not here any of the
"unusual circumstances" referred to in Bryant
v. Turner, supra.
Id.
In the instant case, petitioner had adequate
opportunity

-... .

to the Utah Supreme Court.
1986).

irect appeal

State v. McKenna, 728 P.2d 984 (Utah

Thus, petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel

claim i.innmt he i '^ns l dere I .in 'unusual circumstance" justifying
an exception to the requirement that all claims of error be
raised before the appellate court,
counsel, ;> •
circumstances

.

other than i i leffective

^rt any addi tional "unusual
Therefore, tr.e* trial court properly ru.ri that

the petiti - * *< barred Jut to petitioner's cire „.:••--*

-9-
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, respondent respectfully
requests this Court to affirm the lower courts dismissal of the
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus•
DATED this ^ ^ ^ ^ y

of November, 1988.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

-tt^f^-

DAN R. LARSEN
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Brief was mailed, postage prepaid, to John Francis
McKenna, Pro Se, P. 0. Box 250, Draper, Utah

84020, this

day of November, 1988.
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